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Abstract 
 
In this paper I return to the question of whether intuition is object-
dependent. Kant’s account of the imagination appears to suggest that 
intuition is not object-dependent. On a recent proposal, however, the 
imagination is a faculty of merely inner intuition, the inner objects of which 
exist and are present in the way demanded by object-dependence views, 
such as Allais’s relational account. I argue against this proposal on both 
textual and philosophical grounds. It remains inconsistent with what Kant 
says about how the imagination functions and is ultimately incompatible 
with the relational account it is supposed to support. Kant’s account of the 
imagination remains a serious obstacle for the view that intuition is object-
dependent. 
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1. Object-Dependence and the Inner Intuition Proposal 
 
The question of whether or not intuition is object-dependent is important 
for a number of reasons. Prominent among these is that the answer has 
implications for cognition. It is a core commitment of Kant’s Critical 
philosophy that cognition requires some connection to intuition, the 
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defining role of intuition being that of giving us objects for cognition.1 
Different stances on the issue of object-dependence determine different 
stances on what it takes for intuition to play its role and this in turn 
determines different stances on the nature of cognition.2 Another reason the 
question is important is simply because of what the answer might tell us 
about the nature of intuition itself, about the kind of state it is and the way 
in which it puts us in touch with the world. These topics are closely related. 
The latter is my primary concern here, focusing in particular on empirical 
intuition. Kant’s conception of empirical intuition is intimately tied up with 
his conception of perception and perceptual experience. It is a topic of 
central concern for our investigation of Kant and the philosophy of mind. 
 
One common view is that, for Kant, a subject can only intuit objects that 
exist and are present at the time of intuition (see §2 for details). The focus 
has typically been on outer empirical intuitions, where the objects of such 
intuitions are typically taken to be external, macrophysical things, like trees, 
houses, and ships.3 If one is to visually intuit a house, then the house one 
intuits must really exist and really be in view. If one is to have a tactile 
intuition of a tree, then the tree one intuits must really exist and really be at 
one’s fingertips. 
 
This view attributes a strong form of object-dependence to intuition. 
Something like it is held by a number of commentators with otherwise quite 
different stances on the nature of intuition, but recently it has become 
particularly associated with what we can call the ‘relational’ view. This is the 
view that intuition essentially involves the subjects of intuition standing in a 
certain kind of primitive, non-representational relation of conscious 
acquaintance to the objects of intuition. The obtaining of such relations – 
unlike that of certain kinds of representational relation – requires the 
concurrent existence and presence of their object-relata. Thus the relational 
view of intuition entails the kind of strong object-dependence view just 
sketched. More on the relational view in §4.4 
                                                   
1 A19/B33, A50/B74, A62/B87, A92/B125, and also A95, B165, A155-6/B194-5, A239/B298, 
A719/B747. 
2 See Grüne (this volume: §5) and Gomes and Stephenson (2016). 
3 Kant’s examples – A190ff./B235ff.; JL 9:33, 94. 
4 For the relational view, also called an ‘acquaintance’ or ‘naïve realist’ view, see Allais (this 
volume: §2; 2015: 156ff.; 2011; 2010: 59f.; 2009: 389), McLear (this volume; forthcoming; 
2011: 13), and Gomes (forthcoming; 2014). Others who seem to express an object-
dependence view but not necessarily its relational version include Watkins and Willaschek 
(forthcoming; ms.), Buroker (2006: 37), Hanna (2005: 259; 2001: 209-10), Setiya (2004: 
66), McDowell (1998b: 475), Warren (1998: 221), Willaschek (1997: 547), Cassam (1993: 
117), and Thompson (1972: 331), though some of these are not clear cases – see n.15 below. 
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I have recently argued against the object-dependence view and the relational 
view in particular (Stephenson 2015). In short because, for Kant, 
‘Imagination is the faculty for representing an object in intuition even 
without its presence’ (B151).5 Imaginational episodes – as occur, for example, 
in memory, dreams, and hallucination – involve the intuition of objects that 
are not, in the relevant sense, present. Perhaps the object intuited through 
the imagination is simply no longer in the intuiting subject’s line of sight (or 
at her fingertips, etc.). Perhaps it never was. Perhaps it no longer exists. Or 
perhaps it never did. All of these are possibilities, I argued, and all would 
nonetheless involve genuine, full-blown intuition, with its characteristic 
hallmarks of immediacy and singularity. Intuition therefore does not require 
the existence or presence of its objects and is in no substantial sense object-
dependent. A much weaker, distal causal origin condition can just as well 
explain what Kant means in those texts where he has been taken to say 
otherwise (B72; Prol. 4:281-2), and only such a weak condition is textually 
or indeed philosophically compatible with Kant’s account of the 
imagination.6 
 
Such considerations support a view on which intuition is object-
independent. Call the following kind of view ‘representational’. Intuitions 
are mental states with a certain kind of object-independent representational 
content. This content determines a set of accuracy conditions for the state 
and is itself determined by internal features of the state. None of these 
aspects of intuition are themselves the objects of intuition – they are the 
vehicles not the objects of intuitional representation – for they constitute 
intuition, whereas represented objects are distinct from what represents 
them (A108, A189/B234, A197/B242). Instead, when the accuracy conditions 
of the state are suitably fulfilled, the object of intuition is what fulfils them – 
in the case of outer intuition, this will be some outer thing or state of affairs. 
When the accuracy conditions are not suitably fulfilled, as in the case of the 
intuitions involved in hallucinatory episodes, for instance, the object of 
intuition is something else, something that need not be present or even 
exist. 
 
                                                   
5 Translations are my own. I note when differences to the Cambridge editions might be 
relevant. See §3 for extensive discussion of this particular passage, from the B-edition 
Transcendental Deduction. 
6  I talk throughout in terms of intuition being ‘involved’ in perceptual episodes like 
hallucination and veridical perception because it might be that intuition alone could not 
suffice for such and I take no stance on this here. 
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This sketch under-determines a number of important questions. For 
example concerning what specific account we should give of the ontological 
status of the objects of the intuitions involved in the relevant kinds of 
imaginational episode.7 Note also that nothing has yet been said about the 
objects of consciousness. It is significant that the representational view is more 
flexible than the relational view in this regard. One apparent problem for 
the relational view, which ties intuitions essentially to consciousness, is that 
Kant sometimes seems to allow for unconscious intuitions. He says: ‘The 
field of our sensible intuitions and sensations of which we are not 
conscious… is immense’ (Anth. 7:135). The representational view can 
accommodate this more easily than the relational view. For now I just want 
to note that there are ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ versions of the representational 
view. If the intuiting subject is conscious in her act of intuition, the former 
version of the view identifies the object of her consciousness with the object 
of representation, the latter with (some aspect or other of) the vehicle of 
representation, i.e. with (some aspect or other of) the state itself. On the 
indirect view, and only on the indirect view, subjects only ever enjoy indirect 
access to the objects of representation. More on this in §4. 
 
So how might object-dependence readers of intuition deal with the problem 
of the imagination? 
 
One common response has been to deny that the imagination is a faculty of 
intuition proper. Robert Hanna (2005: 267) talks about quasi-intuition, 
while Lucy Allais (2015: 156; 2010: 59) points out and thinks it significant 
that in connection with the imagination Kant very occasionally talks about 
intuitive representation rather than intuition per se (e.g. at B278).8 I argued 
– and we will see again here, starting with the above quote from B151 – that 
no such distinction is consistently reflected in the texts. On the view in 
question, then, either Kant is inconsistent in how he employs the term 
‘Anschauung’ (‘intuition’), or he uses it equivocally, without 
                                                   
7 The discussion of existence in §2 is relevant to this issue. Some might prefer to talk in 
terms of the intuition as of objects in cases where the object does not exist. I do not think 
this locution does any substantial theoretical work that cannot be taken care of elsewhere. It 
could also be a misleading way of characterising the distinction that is my concern here. 
The problem is that ‘as of ’ is often used to indicate a descriptive or otherwise 
characterisational mode of presentation, and, when used in this sense, the object-
dependence view need not deny that subjects can have intuitions as of objects that do not 
exist. For instance, it might allow that a subject can have an intuition as of a pink elephant, 
even though no such animal exists, if what this means is that a subject can have an intuition 
of an existing and present elephant that is grey but this is perceived as pink. For these 
reasons I will not employ the locution. 
8 See also Watkins and Willaschek (forthcoming). 
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acknowledgement, to range over two fundamentally different kinds of state. 
Neither option is wholly untenable, though nor is either option exegetically 
ideal. The inconsistency or unacknowledged equivocation attributed to Kant 
would by no means be an isolated incident and it would have significant 
repercussions elsewhere in their interpretations. For example, object-
dependence readers often appeal to the immediacy of intuition and its role 
in giving us objects for cognition. Must these central features also be 
understood in two different ways, or does Kant sometimes use the term 
‘Anschauung’ to refer to something that lacks them altogether? 
 
In this paper I want to explore an alternative, potentially more robust line of 
response that the object-dependence reader might take in light of Kant’s 
remarks on the imagination. The idea is to avoid attributing to Kant 
inconsistency or unacknowledged equivocation by assimilating those 
remarks into an object-dependence view of intuition – rather, that is, than 
merely sidelining or otherwise downplaying them. The proposal runs as 
follows. 
 
It is inner empirical intuition rather than outer empirical intuition that is 
involved in the relevant kinds of imaginational episode. The objects of such 
inner empirical intuitions are not external, physical things, but rather 
internal, mental things – certain kinds of sensory state that for convenience 
we can call ‘images’. Thus the fact that such imaginational episodes can 
occur without the existence or presence of the relevant external, physical 
things does not show that there is a kind of intuition that does not require 
the existence or presence of its objects, for such things are not the objects of 
the inner empirical intuitions involved in such episodes, and the sensory 
state images that are the objects of such intuitions do indeed exist and are 
present in these episodes. Both kinds of empirical intuition, then, require 
the existence and presence of their objects. The difference lies not in 
whether or not the intuitions are object-dependent in this way, but rather in 
what kind of thing the object of intuition is. For example, if I hallucinate a 
tree when there is no tree really there, this does not mean that the intuition 
this involves has no existing and present object – it’s just that the existing 
and present object is the mere image of a tree. 
 
There would still be a difference in kind, on this view, between the 
intuitions involved in the relevant kinds of imaginational episode and those 
involved in other kinds of episode, such as veridical perception (or indeed 
illusion, where the object of intuition exists and is present but is 
misperceived in some way). But it would be a difference which Kant marks 
and makes much of – that between inner empirical intuition and outer 
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empirical intuition. And the inner empirical intuitions of the imagination 
would be intuitions proper – singular and immediate representations that 
give us objects. 
 
Call this the ‘inner intuition proposal’.9 It is important to be clear that this 
proposal is significantly stronger than the simple claim that the imagination 
produces images and can do so without the concurrent presence or existence 
of real objects in space matching those images. This much is clear from the 
texts and should be uncontroversial. It is not in itself enough to reconcile 
the object-dependence view of intuition with Kant’s account of the 
imagination, and, correspondingly, there are a variety of ways in which it 
can be assimilated into views on which intuition is object-independent.10 
The inner intuition proposal is rather a series of far more specific claims 
about inner intuition and its objects, namely those outlined above – that the 
relevant kinds of imaginational episode, such as hallucination, involve inner 
intuitions whose present and existing objects are images. It is these specific 
claims that are designed to render the object-dependence view textually and 
philosophically compatible with Kant’s account of the imagination, and it is 
these specific claims that are in dispute here. For if they are correct, and if 
they succeed in their aim, then the inner intuition proposal would mark a 
significant advance in defence of the object-dependence view of intuition. 
 
In §2 I clear some terminological ground, explore the relevant kind of 
object-dependence a little more carefully, and bring out a purely formal 
feature of the condition that will be important in what follows – what I call 
its ‘particularity’. In §3 I look closely at how the inner intuition proposal 
fairs with regard to the texts. I argue that it remains inconsistent with what 
Kant says about the imagination, namely that imaginational intuition 
occurs without the presence of the particular object of intuition. Inner 
images may be present in imaginational episodes, but they therefore cannot 
be the objects of whatever intuition such episodes involve. In §4 I turn to 
two problems with the proposal that are of a more systematic nature. First, 
it would leave Kant with a philosophically bad account of memory, which 
account would also stand in tension with certain other of his commitments. 
Second, the inner intuition proposal would obscure the theoretical role of 
the relational view’s commitment to object-dependence. For the role it gives 
to inner objects in its account of imaginational episodes would ‘screen off’ 
the role given to outer objects in the relational view’s account of non-
                                                   
9 See especially McLear (this volume) and also Leech (2016: 15) and McLear (2014b: §6). 
The proposal is cited with approval in Gomes (forthcoming: n.19) and Allais (2015: 156) and 
discussed in Schafer (ms.). 
10 One example of how this might go is given in the discussion of particularity in §2. 
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imaginational episodes. Ultimately, the two views are philosophically 
incompatible. 
 
Like the relational view itself, the inner intuition proposal is intriguing and 
contains important insights, but Kant’s account of the imagination remains 
a significant obstacle for any version of the view that intuition is strongly 
object-dependent. 
 
2. Strong-Particular-Dependence 
 
The condition in question is what I called ‘Strong-Particular-Dependence’: 
 
(SPD) If, at time t, a subject s intuits an object o, then: at t, 
o exists and is present to s 
 
First some remarks on the terms involved, then on the logical form of the 
condition. I focus on issues pertinent to the employment of SPD in the 
inner intuition proposal.11 
 
Subject and Intuition 
 
As already indicated, my focus here remains on empirical intuition, 
specifically on mature human empirical intuition. I will generally leave this 
implicit. When, for instance, I distinguish between inner and outer 
intuition, I am distinguishing different species of empirical intuition. 
 
Object 
 
Regarding external, physical things, I assume only that macrophysical 
entities like trees can exist and be the objects present in intuition, even 
though, fundamentally, for Kant, matter consists of moving force centres 
(MFNS, especially 4:536ff.). Kant’s scientific realism is not of such a kind as 
to rule out realism about the everyday objects of common sense. Not all 
object-dependence views need commit on this, but it is common to do so, 
and a key part of the relational view. Regarding internal, mental things, the 
                                                   
11 One thing this means I ignore is the concurrency aspect of the condition. There are at 
least two questions here. First, what happens when it is dropped, resulting in what I called 
‘Weak-Particular-Dependence’? (See Stephenson (2015: 490ff.), Grüne (this volume: §2), 
McLear (this volume: §§2-3) – note that there are minor terminological discrepancies.) 
Second, how do we even make sense of concurrency given the complexity, in the Kantian 
context, of the idea of intuitions themselves occurring in time? (See Bader (this volume) for 
relevant discussion.) 
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issue is more complicated. For now I just want to make three preliminary 
cautionary remarks concerning my employment of the term ‘images’ to 
denote the kind of sensory states that, on the inner intuition proposal, are 
the objects of the intuitions involved in the relevant kinds of imaginational 
episode. This label is suitably Kantian,12 but it could be misleading. 
 
First, we are not talking about anything like retinal images. These and other 
states of the body are, in the relevant sense, external and physical. Second, 
sensory state images themselves – unlike, perhaps, pictorial images – need in 
no way ‘resemble’ what they are images ‘of’ (see Prol. 4:290). For present 
purposes, an image ‘of a tree’ is just a sensory state the enjoyment of which 
is subjectively indistinguishable from that of the sensory state one is in when 
one intuits a real tree. (More on this in §4.) Third, sensory state images need 
not be visual at all. We can have intuitions and hallucinatory episodes in 
other sensory modes. Such considerations are likely to be relevant to the 
debate at hand (and I briefly mention one in §3), but I cannot properly 
explore them here. 
 
Images, so understood, would certainly seem to qualify as objects in some 
suitably Kantian sense. Kant’s conceptual repertoire includes an extremely 
permissive notion of an object, easily broad enough to cover this kind of 
entity. He says ‘one can, to be sure, call everything, and even every 
representation, insofar as one is conscious of it, an object’ (A189/B234). It 
might be more controversial whether such images qualify as objects in a 
sense that makes them suitable candidates for being the objects of inner 
intuitions, but let us grant this. It is a further question whether they can be 
the objects of inner intuitions in such a way as to play the role assigned to 
them by the inner intuition proposal and I return to this central issue in 
§§3-4.  
 
Existence 
 
SPD concerns what we can call ‘real’ rather than merely ‘logical’ existence.13 
For present purposes – since we are only concerned with the empirical 
phenomenal realm and not with the pure or the noumenal realms – we can 
think of real existence as casually efficacious existence in space and/or time. 
In the sense relevant for SPD, the external, physical objects of outer 
intuition exist, if they exist, in space and time, while the internal, mental 
objects of inner intuition exist, if they exist, in time. 
                                                   
12 A120f., A140ff./B179ff., A475/B503, A570/B598, A780/B808; Anth. 7:167ff.; R330, 15:130; 
AF 25:511. 
13 See Stang (2016) for extensive discussion of Kant’s various conceptions of existence. 
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We need not worry too much about the vexed issue of what exactly 
existence in space amounts to in the Kantian context. All we need in order 
to be able to make sense of the inner intuition proposal is a conception on 
which external, physical things as well as internal, mental things like images 
really exist, and yet do so in different ways, independent to some extent. I 
take it that such a conception is available to Kant on even the most 
phenomenalist interpretations of his transcendental idealism. Even if 
existence in space outside us amounts to nothing more than a special kind 
of existence in the mind, it must indeed be a special kind of existence in the 
mind, distinct in some significant way from whatever kind of existence in 
the mind might be enjoyed by ‘the mere effect of the imagination’ (B278; cf. 
A201-2/B247). Some such distinction is required to make sense of Kant’s 
repeated professions of empirical realism.14 
 
The logical notion of existence is less committal than that of real existence. 
We might think of logical existence along the lines of being the subject of 
predication, or in more anachronistic terms, the value of a bound variable. 
Details would take us too far afield. I draw attention to the distinction just 
to allow that there are a variety of ways of ‘being something’ without 
existing in space and/or time and being causally efficacious – logical 
existence does not entail real existence. It is therefore possible to hold that 
intuitions require the logical existence of their objects but not the real 
existence of their objects.15 This would not be the kind of object-dependence 
at issue here – it is not what is captured by SPD under its intended 
interpretation. Again, there are object-independence views that might allow 
that intuitions require the merely logical existence of their objects. This 
would depend on issues orthogonal to the current dispute. As before, I will 
generally leave this implicit. When I talk about existence, I am talking about 
real existence. 
 
Presence 
 
In ordinary language, the English word ‘present’ and its cognates typically 
pick out – indexically and with varying degrees of precision – a location in 
space and/or time. It is this ‘spatiotemporal’ conception of presence that is 
                                                   
14 Bxxxix-xli, A28/B44, A35/B52, B69, B274–9, A367–80; Prol. 4:292–4, 374–5. See also 
A45–6/B62–3, B69–71, A183/B227, A293–8/B349–54; Prol. 4:289, 290–1, 375. 
15 See Stang (2016: especially 163n. and also 301, 322). Tolley (2013: 116; forthcoming; ms.) 
and Schafer (ms.) also fall into this category and it may be that others who on the face of it 
might seem to express an object-dependence view do as well. 
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active in SPD.16 I take it that this coheres with Kant’s own terminology in 
the disputed texts. The word Kant uses when talking about intuition 
without presence is ‘Gegenwart’ (or its adjectival/adverbal form 
‘gegenwärtig’), and it is fairly clear he is talking about spatiotemporal 
presence. This is explicitly how he uses the term(s) elsewhere, and there is no 
particular reason to think his usage in the imagination texts anomalous.17  
 
There is also a more specifically philosophical notion of ‘mental’ presence. 
Here we talk of an object’s presence to consciousness (e.g. Allais 2015) or of 
an object being present to mind (Watkins and Willaschek forthcoming), as 
well as, in a closely related verbal phrase, of subjects being presented with 
objects (e.g. Gomes forthcoming and Allais this volume). The object-
dependence view also requires that the objects of intuition be present in this 
sense. I return to this issue in detail in §4. In the meantime presence means 
spatiotemporal presence. For now I just want to observe that object-
independence views need not deny that the objects of intuition must be 
mentally present. The dispute concerns what exactly this amounts to. 
 
Particularity 
 
So far in this section I have been talking about the content of SPD. Before 
moving on, I want to draw attention to a purely formal feature of the 
condition. It will be crucial that SPD requires that the object of intuition be 
the very same object that exists and is present to the subject of intuition. The 
point here is simply that our quantifiers take wide scope over the 
conditional, forcing the same object to satisfy the condition in both the 
antecedent and consequent on any uniform assignment of values to 
variables. Call this the ‘particularity’ of SPD. It is essential to the kind of 
condition SPD is – to the specific range of views it picks out and thus to the 
specific way in which it is significant for our investigation of Kant and the 
philosophy of mind. 
 
For suppose the condition were simply that intuition requires the existence 
and presence of some object or other but not necessarily that of the intuited 
object in particular. We might want to call this an ‘object-dependence’ 
                                                   
16 It is notoriously difficult to state precisely what such a requirement amounts to. I ignore 
such issues here because there are not specific to the inner intuition proposal. 
17 See especially B18, A174/B216, A771/B799; MFNS 4:485f., 497, 513; Anth. 7:154, 186, 193, 
222, 255, 264; DS 2:288, 321ff., 336, 347; R343, 15:135, R371, 15:145, R1086, 15:482. And also 
A82/B108; CPJ 5:484; ID 2:392f. I take this to hold of Kant’s discussion of intuition and 
presence in the Prolegomena (4:281f.) as well. For discussion, see Stephenson (2015: 490-91) 
and especially Grüne (this volume: §2) and McLear (this volume: §§2-3). 
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condition, but it would track something quite different to the kind of 
object-dependence currently at stake. Some commentators attribute to Kant 
a version of the thesis that the mind is essentially embodied.18 This might 
have the consequence that intuition requires the existence and presence of 
some object, namely the body. But the question of whether Kant held a 
version of the embodied mind thesis is orthogonal to that of whether 
intuition is, for instance, relational or representational. 
 
Or take another example. Based on Kant’s account of the imagination in the 
A-edition Deduction (A100ff.) and in particular his suggestion that ‘the 
imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself ’ (A120n.), we 
might want to hold that imaginational images are involved in all intuition, 
regardless of whether the intuition is involved in veridical or non-veridical 
perceptual episodes. On the representational version of the object-
independence view, such images might then be understood as vehicles of 
intuitional representational content, and thereby, in the context of the inner 
intuition proposal, as in some sense objects that must exist and be present in 
intuition. But such images would not themselves be the objects of intuition 
on such a view – they are not themselves the objects of intuitional 
representation. Thus the representational view could accept a 
departicularised object-dependence condition without thereby also 
committing to SPD. 
 
It is SPD with its particularity that is at issue here. This is the object-
dependence condition entailed by the relational view and rejected by the 
representational view, for instance, so it is evidence for or against this 
condition that is relevant for deciding between these views. It is to such 
evidence that I now turn, specifically to the question of whether the inner 
intuition proposal outlined in §1 can help maintain SPD in the face of what 
Kant says about the imagination. 
 
3. Textual Considerations 
 
Particularity in the Transcendental Deduction 
 
Let us begin with the characterisation of the imagination quoted in §1. It is 
taken from the B-edition Transcendental Deduction. This is surely an 
authoritative text, so it will be worth taking some extra care to get clear on 
what Kant means. The German reads: 
 
                                                   
18 See Cassam (1993), Hanna (2006), and Rukgaber (2009). 
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Einbildungskraft ist das Vermögen, einen Gegenstand auch 
ohne dessen Gegenwart in der Anschauung vorzustellen. (B151) 
 
Guyer and Wood (in Kant 1998a), following Meiklejohn (in Kant 1855), 
translate the sentence like so: 
 
(1) Imagination is the faculty for representing an object even 
without its presence in intuition. 
 
This translation leaves it open for object-dependence readers of intuition to 
deny that the imagination is a faculty of intuition and thus maintain SPD. 
One might even take the sentence to imply that intuition does require 
presence, that it should be parsed as something like this: ‘even when an 
object is not present, as it must be in intuition, it can be represented 
through the imagination’. Call this ‘reading 1’. (I will explain in a moment 
why I separate out the readings from the translations.) Note, however, that 
the following translation, closer to those of Kemp Smith (in Kant 1929) and 
Pluhar (in Kant 1996b), has quite different connotations: 
 
(2) Imagination is the faculty for representing an object in 
intuition even without its presence. 
 
This translation suggests the imagination is indeed a faculty of intuition, 
specifically a faculty for intuiting an object without its presence, and 
therefore that intuition as such does not require presence, contrary to SPD 
and the object-dependence view. Call this ‘reading 2’. 
 
So which reading, if either, is preferable? 
 
Previously I had observed only that both are equally natural takes on the 
original German (Stephenson 2015: 497-98). I now want to say something 
much stronger, namely that reading 2 reflects the only plausible take on what 
Kant can mean here. The reason is what he goes on to say in the next 
sentence: 
 
Now since all of our intuition is sensible, the imagination, 
because of the subjective condition under which it alone can 
give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of the 
understanding, belongs to sensibility… (B151)19 
                                                   
19 Kant goes on to say that there is also an aspect of the imagination that is an ‘effect of the 
understanding on sensibility’ (B152). This is the ‘productive’ imagination with its ‘a priori’ 
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There are two things about this passage that tell strongly in favour of reading 
2 and against reading 1. First, that Kant talks about the imagination giving ‘a 
corresponding intuition to the concepts of the understanding’, thus 
implying that imagination is indeed a faculty of intuition. Second, that he 
infers that the imagination ‘belongs to sensibility’ from the fact that ‘all of 
our intuition is sensible’, an inference that only makes sense if imagination 
is a faculty of intuition.20 
 
What we have here, then, is an absolutely central text that directly 
contradicts SPD. This is not a late or peripheral text. Nor does Kant talk 
about merely intuitive representation. This text presents a serious obstacle 
for the object-dependence view of intuition. 
 
To clarify, the reason I have separated the readings from the translations is 
that I take it that translation (1) could be given reading 2. Consider the 
following slight modification: 
 
(1*) Imagination is the faculty for representing an object, 
even without its presence, in intuition. 
 
(1*) has the same connotations as (2) and is not a wholly unnatural way to 
parse (1). If so, (1) is simply ambiguous between reading 1 and reading 2. 
The same is true of the original German sentence when taken in isolation – 
the sentence is a classic case of structural ambiguity. By better preserving the 
original word order, (1) better preserves the ambiguity. As a translation of 
the sentence in isolation, then, (1) might be preferable to (2). Though which 
is a better translation of the sentence all things considered will depend on 
principles of translation that need not concern us here. What is important 
here is just that, whichever translation we adopt, what Kant says in the 
following sentence shows that he must have reading 2 in mind, i.e., that he 
is thinking of the imagination as a faculty for intuiting objects without their 
presence. 
 
Our question now is whether the inner intuition proposal can help preserve 
SPD and the object-dependence view of intuition in the face of such a text. 
Would it be consistent with this text to maintain that the relevant kinds of 
imaginational episode involve inner intuitions which have inner images as 
                                                                                                                            
synthesis. Here we are concerned solely with the ‘reproductive’ imagination and its 
‘empirical’ synthesis (cf. Anth. 7:167ff.). 
20 My thanks to Stefanie Grüne for bringing this point to my attention. 
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their existing and present objects, thereby satisfying SPD? It would not, and 
this is where the particularity of SPD comes into play. 
 
The pronoun ‘dessen’ (‘its’) in ‘ohne dessen Gegenwart’ (‘without its presence’) 
refers to that which is represented in intuition, i.e. that which is intuited – 
the intuited object or object of intuition. So what Kant says here is that it is 
the object of intuition that is not present in imaginational intuition. This is 
inconsistent with the inner intuition proposal, which would have it that the 
object of intuition is present in imaginational intuition. The proposal’s 
qualification that this object is merely an inner object of an inner intuition 
is irrelevant. The problem can be put as follows. In essence, the inner 
intuition proposal amounts to the suggestion that the object-dependence 
view of intuition broaden its conception of the intuitions and objects 
covered by SPD so as to include inner intuitions and their inner objects. 
But this has no effect on the particularity of SPD, which is a purely formal, 
syntactic feature of the condition, not a semantic one. And it is the 
particularity of SPD which makes it inconsistent with what Kant says at 
B151. The inner intuition proposal does not affect this. 
 
Particularity in Other Texts 
 
The same appears to be true of the other passages in which the relevant 
feature of the imagination is stated explicitly and which were written by 
Kant himself. From the Anthropology: 
 
Sensibility in the cognitive faculty (the faculty of 
representations in intuition) contains two parts: sense and 
imagination. – The first is the faculty of intuition in the 
presence of the object, the second even without the presence 
of the object. (7:153) 
 
Imagination (facultas imaginandi), as a faculty of intuitions 
even without presence of the object, is either productive, that 
is, a faculty of the original presentation of the object 
(exhibitio originaria), which thus precedes experience; or 
reproductive, a faculty of the derivative presentation of the 
object (exhibitio derivativa), which brings back into the mind 
an empirical intuition had previously. – Pure intuitions of 
space and time belong to the first presentation…(7:167)21 
                                                   
21 In the first passage, Robert Louden (in Kant 2007) translates ‘des Gegenstandes’ and 
‘desselben’ with indefinite articles and ‘Vorstellungen in der Anschauung’ with ‘intuitive 
representations’. In the second passage, Louden translates the plural ‘Anschauungen’ with 
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And from a series of handwritten notes connected to the Refutation of 
Idealism: 
 
Imagination is intuition even without presence of the object, 
and the object is then called a phantasm, which can be a 
production (invention) or reproduction (recollection) of an 
intuition that was had previously. (R6315, 18:618) 
 
We have two sorts of intuition: sensible intuition, for which 
the object must be represented as present, and imagination 
as intuition without presence of the object. (6315, 18:619) 
 
In each case, Kant uses definite articles in talking about the absent objects, 
and I take it that the most natural reading of these passages, especially in 
light of what we have seen him commit to in the B-edition Deduction, is 
that he is talking about the objects of imaginational intuitions. That is, he is 
saying that the imagination is a faculty of intuition without the presence of 
the object of intuition. If so, these passages again contradict the particularity 
of SPD and thereby the object-dependence view of intuition, regardless of 
whether or not it is supplemented with the inner intuition proposal. 
 
Now, it should be acknowledged that these cases are not quite so clear-cut as 
the previous one. As a matter of sheer grammar, it could be that the absent 
objects of which Kant speaks are not themselves the objects of imaginational 
intuition. If so, these passages might be at least consistent with the inner 
intuition proposal. But what other candidate is there for the absent objects, 
if not the objects of imaginational intuition? One answer might be that 
Kant is referring specifically to the particular spatial objects of outer 
intuitions. On this reading, these, and only these, are what are absent in 
imaginational intuition, thus leaving room for the inner intuition proposal’s 
claim that inner objects are still present in such intuitions. 
 
However, there are at least two considerations that tell against such a 
reading (in addition to the fact that it is unavailable for the B151 text). The 
first is what it would mean for the cases of productive imagination that Kant 
mentions in the middle two passages. Our intuitions of space and time 
would then not be what Kant is connecting to the productive imagination. 
Instead this faculty would involve the ‘original presentation’ of the particular 
spatial objects of outer intuitions, a presentation that ‘precedes experience’. 
                                                                                                                            
the singular or abstract ‘intuition’. Allais (2015: 157n.) makes a point that appears to turn on 
these errors. 
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This seems to get things the wrong way round (see especially A101f., A115-
124, B151-4). The second consideration is Kant’s use of the term ‘phantasm’ 
to name the absent object in the third passage. This sounds like a term for 
an imaginary object of imaginational intuition rather than for a spatial 
object of outer intuition that happens not to be present. Of course a subject 
might mistake a phantasm for a real spatial object.22 And of course the inner 
intuition proposal might well use ‘phantasm’ rather than ‘image’ as a label 
for its inner objects. But the problem is that the proposal says that such 
objects are present in imaginational intuition, whereas what Kant says here 
is that the phantasm is not present. The prospects for exploiting the 
aforementioned grammatical loophole do not look very good. 
 
Finally, we have various student lecture notes.23 Again, many (though not 
all) of these are strictly speaking compatible with the inner intuition 
proposal. For instance, it does not contravene the particularity of SPD to 
talk very generally of ‘intuitions in the absence of objects’ (MD 28:673) – 
perhaps the objects referred to here are outer rather than inner ones and 
thus, on the inner intuition proposal, not the objects of imaginational 
intuition. I have discussed these texts elsewhere and I won’t repeat them 
here (Stephenson 2015: 496-7). A broader methodological point will suffice. 
 
Such texts can be extremely useful, but they should never trump what Kant 
himself wrote, especially in the B-edition Transcendental Deduction. One 
problem is that they can be unreliable, especially on matters as fine as these. 
An example illustrates the point nicely. In student notes to lectures Kant 
gave around 1780, he is reported as saying the following: 
 
…cognition is a representation, representatio. A 
representation with consciousness is perceptio. I have a 
hallucination [Wahn] and think I am conscious of it. Insofar 
as I also pay attention to the object with such a 
representation, this is cognitio, cognition. The cognition is 
twofold, intuitus, intuition, conceptus, concept. (VL 24:904) 
 
On the face of it such a statement would seem to support the object-
independence view of intuition, since it is much less natural for object-
dependence views to allow hallucination as a species of cognition.24 But 
                                                   
22 Cf. R4756, 17:699, to my knowledge the only other place Kant uses the term, talking of 
‘the phantasm of things existing as if externally’. 
23 DWL 24:701, 705, 753; AF 25:511; AM 25:1301; ML1 28:230; MVo 28:449; ML2 28:585; 
MD 28:673; MMr 29:881. 
24 See Gomes and Stephenson (2016: §3). 
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notice: first, the passage bears a striking resemblance to the so-called 
‘Stufenleiter’ (A320/B376-7), Latinate cognates included; second, relatedly, 
hallucination pops up rather out of the blue and then disappears again. This 
suggests that ‘Wahn’ ought to read ‘Wahrnehmung’ (‘perception’), and it 
seems likely that a student simply misheard or miswrote.25 
 
The Inner (and particularity again) 
 
So far in this section I have been considering textual problems for the inner 
intuition proposal that arise from the particularity of SPD. These problems 
affect the proposal’s claim that images are the present and existing objects in 
virtue of which imaginational intuitions satisfy SPD. What about the other 
central part of the proposal, namely the claim that imaginational intuitions 
are inner intuitions? 
 
Here the texts are less clear and I want to be more concessive. On occasion 
Kant certainly does connect the imagination to inner sense and inner 
appearances: 
 
It is said that inner sense is also subject to illusions, which 
consist in the person taking the appearances of inner sense… 
for outer appearances, that is, taking imaginings for 
sensations… it is mental illness: the tendency to accept the 
play of ideas of inner sense as experiential cognition… 
(Anth. 7:161; cf. AM 25:1257) 
 
Since imagination and its product is itself only an object of 
inner sense, the empirical consciousness (apprehensio) of this 
state can only contain succession. (R6313, 18:614) 
 
But most of the time he does not make this connection, and elsewhere what 
he says seems in tension with it. Sometimes directly: 
 
…the imagination can only create a representation of the 
outer by affecting outer sense… (R6313, 18:613) 
 
Sometimes indirectly, as when he distinguishes sense in general from 
imagination in general and only then goes on to distinguish the two types of 
                                                   
25 Or perhaps Kant himself misspoke. In any case it seems unlikely the mistake is in the 
Academy Edition transcription rather in the manuscript itself – see Michael Young’s 
Introduction in Kant (1992: xxx-xxxi) and an editor’s note on the word in question at 
28:1081.  
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sense, inner and outer (Anth. 7:153; cf. AM 25:1242). Or, on the assumption 
that the imagination can represent things ‘as spatial’, when he denies that 
inner sense can do so: 
 
What I represent to myself as spatial cannot be counted as a 
representation of inner sense, for the form of this is time, 
which has only one dimension. (R6315, 18:620-1; cf. Bxl-xli, 
A34/B50-51, B275-76; R6313, 18:614, quoted above) 
 
Relatedly, it would seem we could undergo hallucinations in different 
sensory modes, not only visual but also auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc. But 
Kant thinks of these modes as species of outer sense (Anth. 7:153ff.; cf. AM 
25:1242). And bringing the last two points together, it seems the different 
modes of hallucination should feel different to the subject, just as different 
modes of sensing do. How would this be explained on the inner intuition 
proposal?26 
 
Consider finally the only passage (that I know of) in which Kant explicitly 
ties the imagination to inner intuition: 
 
The imagination, if one is conscious of it as such, can also be 
considered as inner sensible intuition. (R6315, 18:619) 
 
There is an alternative reading of this passage on which Kant is not saying 
that acts of the imagination produce mere inner intuitions but is rather 
talking about these acts of imagination themselves becoming objects of 
inner intuition. This happens when we become aware that we are 
undergoing hallucination, for example – we become ‘conscious of [the 
imagination] as such [einer solchen]’, which is to say, as merely imagination 
and not veridical perception. It is a kind of self-awareness that helps us 
avoid forming false beliefs on the basis of hallucination. And it is a kind of 
self-awareness that fits very well into the role normally assigned to inner 
intuition. (A similar reading might be given of Kant’s talk of the power of 
imagination and its product ‘itself ’ being ‘an object of the inner sense’ at 
R6313, 18:614, quoted above.) 
 
                                                   
26 This is a pertinent question even if one thinks that Kant locates any error that might 
occur in connection to hallucination at the level of judgment rather than intuition (see 
McLear this volume: §4). Macbeth might mistake a dagger proceeding from the heat-
oppressed brain for a real dagger, and this might involve an important doxastic element, 
but surely nothing at the level of judgment could fully explain the difference between a 
visual hallucination of a dagger and a tactile(?) hallucination of being stabbed. 
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The texts, then, are simply not decisive. Perhaps Kant vacillates. Perhaps he 
thinks of imaginational intuition as in a class of its own, neither inner nor 
outer. In any case, it is crucial to be clear on how much the object-
independence view can concede. There is no doubt that imaginational 
intuitions are in some sense less connected to ‘the outer’ than intuitions 
involved in veridical perceptual episodes. But this is trivial. The object-
independence view of course does not claim that there is no difference 
whatsoever between the two cases.  There is, after all, no outer object present 
in the former case as there is in the latter case, and no causal affection from 
outside occurs (concurrently and in a way suitably hooked up to the 
intuition in question). Kant defines outer sense as ‘where the human body is 
affected by physical things’ (Anth. 7:153), so this undeniable difference takes 
care of those passages where Kant distinguishes the imagination from outer 
sense and calls the latter ‘a relation of intuition to something actual outside 
me’ (Bxl, n.). The object-independence view can even accept that there is 
some special connection to inner sense in the case of imaginational 
intuitions, for it can allow that it is in some sense the mind itself rather than 
an external thing that is the proximal causal origin of such intuitions (Anth. 
7:153). 
 
Regardless of what we call imaginational intuitions, the real difference 
between the views rather comes down to this. Are the objects of 
imaginational intuitions inner images, sensory states of the intuiting subject 
that exist and are present at the time of the intuition? The object-
dependence view, supplemented with the inner intuition proposal, says 
‘Yes’; the object-independence view says ‘No’. But this in turn does not 
mean that the object-independence view need deny that there can be some 
sensory state that exists and is present in imaginational episodes. This view 
can well allow that the subject of hallucination is in a sensory state, that she 
is undergoing perceptual experiences (in the contemporary sense). And 
sensory states take time and can be causally efficacious, so it might also want 
to concede that they exist and are present in such episodes. What the object-
independence view denies – and what the object-dependence view 
supplemented with the inner intuition proposal affirms – is that these sensory 
states are what is represented in imaginational intuition, that these sensory 
states are the objects of imaginational intuition, hence are that in virtue of 
which imaginational intuition satisfies SPD. And here we are back to 
particularity. 
 
4. Philosophical Considerations 
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So far I have focused on textual problems with the inner intuition proposal. 
I now turn to two problems of a more philosophical nature. The first is 
fairly straightforward. It is philosophical in the sense that the inner intuition 
proposal would leave Kant with a philosophically bad view. It is also textual 
insofar as this bad view does not sit well with some of Kant’s core claims 
about cognition and its relation to intuition. The second problem is more 
complicated and although it may apply to other versions of the object-
dependence view, it is sharpest for the relational view. It is philosophical in 
the sense that the inner intuition proposal would bring into doubt the very 
nature and purpose of the kind of position the relational view attributes to 
Kant. 
 
Memory 
 
The focus in the literature, as here, has been on imagination as it functions 
in hallucination. But there are other relevant kinds of imaginational episode. 
Specifically, Kant also connects the imagination to memory. The 
Anthropology includes a section ‘On memory’ under the title ‘On the faculty 
of visualizing the past and the future by means of the imagination’ (7:182-
5).27 The problem is that the inner intuition proposal would have it that the 
objects of recollective intuitions are mere inner images, but surely what we 
remember in such episodes are the outer objects themselves. Suppose a 
friend calls me up. She has lost her scarf and wants to know whether I 
remember if she had it when she arrived at my party. I try to remember. We 
might want to say I do so by bringing back to mind an image of her 
standing in my hallway with her scarf on. But what I remember when I 
remember that she did have it on is my friend and her scarf (or a fact about 
them). This distinction is built into the representational view with its 
distinction between vehicle and object of representation, but the inner 
intuition proposal leaves my friend and her scarf out of the picture. 
 
We can press the issue further by considering the connection between 
memory and higher cognitive states like belief and knowledge. Through an 
act of memory, I form a belief, perhaps I have knowledge, about my friend 
and her scarf. In more specifically Kantian terms, memory is a source of 
‘historical cognition’ (JL 9:22; BL 24:47; DWL 24:704; MMr 29:881). 
Assuming that we identify the object of intuition with the object of 
                                                   
27 See also A53/B77, A649/B677; Anth. 7:167, 197; Ped. 9:475-6; ML1 28:237, 262; MMr 
29:881, 884; MD 28:673-4; AF 25:512, 521; AM 25:1289. Occasionally it can seem as though 
Kant thinks imagination and memory distinct, but all things considered I think he means 
to distinguish two kinds of imaginational activity, its recollective activity being more under 
a subject’s control than, say, its hallucinatory activity. 
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cognition, the inner intuition proposal would have it that historical 
cognition through memory is cognition of mere images (and perhaps 
thereby of the self). Not only does this seem philosophically wrong. It also 
seems in tension with the characteristic objectivity of cognition (see 
especially A19/B33, A92-3/B125-6, A197/B242, A320/B376). And it would 
not be an attractive way out of this problem to query the aforementioned 
identity assumption. Kant frequently identifies the object of intuition with 
the object of cognition (e.g. at A19/B33 and A50/B74) and such an 
identification seems a prerequisite for making sense of intuition’s role of 
giving us objects for cognition. This latter point holds generally, but is 
especially apt with regard to the object-dependence view of intuition. As 
mentioned in §1, it is a core motivation for this view that it is supposed to 
better explain how intuitions give us objects for cognition. This brings us to 
the second problem. 
 
The Role of Object-Dependence 
 
I will argue that, in effect, the inner intuition proposal and the relational 
view are incompatible. This is because the inner intuition proposal would 
leave the relational view with no theoretical role for SPD, bringing into 
doubt whether the relational view is a kind of object-dependence view at all. 
In order to see how this problem arises, we need to know more about the 
relational view and its relation to the representational view. 
 
The relational version of the object-dependence view has a very strong 
reading of intuitional immediacy. Intuition, on the relational view, relates 
subjects immediately to objects in the sense that it does not involve there 
being any mental intermediary between subject and object. This is a 
consequence of the primitive, non-representational nature of the conscious 
acquaintance relations in terms of which the relational view analyses 
intuition. Such relations do not hold in virtue of internal states of the 
intuiting subject and their representational content.28 That is, they do not 
hold because (features of) the internal states of the subject somehow 
resemble or are structurally isomorphic with (features of) the objects of 
intuition. So intuition is immediate in that it does not involve mental 
intermediaries and its conscious acquaintance relations are primitive and 
non-representational. But surely we must also say something positive, 
something more by way of an explanation (albeit not a reductive one) of 
what conscious acquaintance is. 
 
                                                   
28 For very helpful discussion, see Gomes (forthcoming: especially §2 and§4). 
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Another way to put the point. For Allais, the ‘fundamental Kantian 
notion… is that of the presence to consciousness of the object’ (2009: 390). 
She says: ‘on my view, intuitions present us with particulars immediately 
because they involve the presence to consciousness of the things they 
represent. They do not merely represent objects, but present them’ (2015: 
147; cf. 106ff., 153ff.; 2010: 57ff.). Here we return to the mental conception 
of presence mentioned in §2. In these terms the point is that more needs to 
be said about the particular account of mental presence that is at work here 
if these claims are to pick out the relational view. Both Allais (2015: 25) and 
Gomes (forthcoming) observe, quite rightly, that we should not take Kant’s 
representationalist idiom to prejudge the question of whether intuition is 
object-independent and representational rather than object-dependent and 
relational. But nor should we take a presentational idiom to prejudge such 
matters. For the representational view need not deny that intuition involves 
the presence to consciousness of its objects.29 The substance of the dispute 
concerns the correct analysis of this claim. 
 
Now, it seems to me that this is a dispute about something we nowadays call 
‘phenomenal character’. This is a contemporary phrase, but the appeal to 
some such notion is inevitable, not anachronistic. If an object is present to 
consciousness, then there is a subject who is thereby conscious, and if there 
is a subject who is conscious, then there is a way things are for her, 
subjectively – a way things feel or seem for her in being so conscious. 
Indeed, there being a way things seem for a subject is just part of what it is 
for the subject to be conscious. This is what the notion of phenomenal 
character picks out. Phenomenal character is the character of consciousness 
– it (partially) constitutes consciousness. More specifically, then, we are 
considering views about intuition that grant it some central role in 
distinctively perceptual episodes. So intuitional mental presence is supposed 
be the kind of presence to consciousness, and thereby the kind of 
phenomenal character, characteristic of perceptual episodes. In these terms, 
the dispute is as follows. 
 
On the representational view, the phenomenal character that (partially) 
constitutes intuitional consciousness is itself (at least partially) constituted 
                                                   
29 On the direct representational view, just as the states themselves are vehicles rather than 
objects of representation, so too are they vehicles rather than objects of consciousness. The 
mental intermediaries that this view posits ‘between’ subject and object in no way form a 
‘veil of perception’. This view is not so strange. After all, it is an undeniable empirical fact 
that there are physical intermediaries between the subject’s consciousness and the object of 
which she is conscious – light and retinal images, for example. We can accept this without 
thinking they form a veil, so why should mental intermediaries be different? 
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by internal features of the state and its (object-independent) representational 
content. In the ‘good’ case, where the subject is suitably causally hooked up 
to the world, how things thereby seem to the subject is in turn suitably 
matched by how things in fact are in the world. In the ‘bad’ case, where the 
subject is not suitably causally hooked up to the world but is rather 
hallucinating, things can nevertheless seem just as they did in the good case, 
even though how things seem is now not suitably matched by how things 
are. As Kant puts it: 
 
The difference between truth and dream, however, is not 
decided through the quality of the representations that are 
related to objects, for they are the same in both… (Prol. 
4:290) 
 
On the representational view, there is identity of phenomenal character 
across the good and bad cases because there is identity of state and content. 
 
On the relational view, things are very different. The phenomenal character 
that (partially) constitutes intuitional consciousness is itself (at least 
partially) constituted by the object of intuition (and its features). On this 
view, rather than being merely caused by and representationally related to 
how things are, how things seem just is how things are. As Allais (2015: 107) 
puts it: ‘the qualitative features of perceptual experience are features of the 
objects perceived’. This is how immediate and direct the connection 
between the mind and the world is on the relational view of intuition. The 
redness in how things appear to a subject in intuition, for instance, just is 
the redness in the object intuited. This is what it means for objects and their 
features to be ‘manifest’ to us (Allais 2015). It is in this way that the 
relational view can be expressed as a view on which the objects of intuition 
are ‘literal constituents’ of intuition.30 And it is this account of intuitional 
consciousness and its phenomenal character that is the most fundamental 
reason the relational view entails SPD and is thus a version of the object-
dependence view of intuition. The account has several consequences but 
what concerns us here is what it means for hallucination. 
 
Unlike the representational view, the relational view cannot allow that 
hallucinatory episodes have the same phenomenal character as their 
                                                   
30 See Allais (2015: 12, 105ff., 134, 197). For further discussion and references, see McLear 
(forthcoming), Gomes (forthcoming: §2), and Stephenson (2016: §2), where I argue that 
Allais’s relational view of intuition stands in tension with her account of transcendental 
idealism. 
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subjectively indistinguishable veridical counterparts.31 For the objects that 
constitute the phenomenal character of the latter are absent in the former in 
a way that rules this out – how things seem in cases of hallucination cannot 
be how things are because it is the nature of such cases that how things seem 
is precisely not how things are. Moreover – and this is the rub – if the 
relational view were to allow an account of the phenomenal character of 
hallucination, and if this account were given in terms of features of the state 
that also obtain in their veridical counterparts, then this would call into 
question the view’s account of the phenomenal character of veridical cases. 
For if things seem the same in the bad case as in the good case despite the 
absence of the object, and if this seeming is accounted for by features 
common to both cases, then what role is the presence of the object really 
playing in the account of how things seem in the good case? The presence of 
the object in an account of the phenomenal character of the good case 
would have become inessential. Any explanation of how things seem in the 
bad case in terms of features shared between it and the good case would 
‘screen off’ an appeal to the object in an explanation of how things seem in 
the good case – how things seem in such a case would already have been 
explained without the object, contra the relational view.32 To avoid this 
problem, the relational view must therefore eschew any such account of the 
bad case. 
 
The objection I want to pose, then, is that the inner intuition proposal 
provides just such an account. It explains the phenomenal character of 
hallucinatory episodes in a way that would screen off the relational view’s 
object-involving account of the phenomenal character of veridical episodes, 
its object-involving account of intuitional presence to consciousness. The 
sensory state images present in hallucinatory episodes are just sensations 
reproduced from genuine cases of outer affection.33 On the inner intuition 
proposal, these are what account for the phenomenal character of 
hallucinatory episodes. As Colin McLear puts it: ‘sensings and imaginings 
                                                   
31 In an earlier draft of this material I expressed doubt as to whether we should expect to 
find in Kant the distinction required here between identity of phenomenal character and 
subjective indistinguishability, but Patrick Frierson pointed out to me that something along 
these lines seems to play a role in Kant’s discussions of respect for the moral law (G 4:397ff.; 
CPrR 5:72ff.) and judgments of taste (CPJ 5:280ff.). 
32 This kind of argument is due to Martin (2004: 61-63; cf. 2006: 368-70). In Stephenson 
(2015: §6) I argued that it presents a problem for the relational view per se, since Kant’s 
account of the imagination provides for a rich, bottom-up explanation of the phenomenal 
character of hallucinatory episodes. My claim here is that the inner intuition proposal 
intensifies this issue. 
33 A100f., A120f., A770–1/B798–9; Anth. 7:167-8; R5653, 18:309–10, R6312, 18:613, R6315, 
18:619; VL 24: 904. 
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are phenomenally indiscriminable because they both involve the same type 
of (merely subjective) sensory occurrences’ (this volume: xx, my emphasis). 
But if such inner sensory states are sufficient to account for the phenomenal 
character of intuitional consciousness in the bad case, why not also in the 
good case, contra the relational account? 
 
Supplementing the relational view with the inner intuition proposal would 
leave the presence and existence of the outer object without an essential role 
to play in the view’s account of the intuitional presence to consciousness 
involved in veridical perceptual episodes. But this account is a core part of 
the view. It is at the heart of the view’s account of intuitional immediacy 
and what distinguishes it from object-independent, representational views. 
Without it, it would become altogether unclear just what the view is. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have argued against the proposal that the imagination produces merely 
inner intuitions whose objects are inner images that exist and are present in 
the way demanded by the object-dependence view of intuition. The main 
textual problem for the proposal is that it remains inconsistent with what 
Kant says, namely that imaginational intuition occurs without the presence 
of the particular object of intuition. Inner image objects may exist and be 
present in imaginational episodes, but these cannot be the objects of 
whatever intuition such episodes involve. The main philosophical problem 
is that the proposal is incompatible with the relational view it is supposed to 
support, for its account of the character of imaginational consciousness in 
terms of inner image objects screens off the relational view’s account of the 
character of non-imaginational consciousness in terms of external physical 
objects. Kant’s account of the imagination remains a significant obstacle for 
any version of the object-dependence view, but it is especially problematic 
for the relational view, which has very specific consequences for what can be 
said about imaginational episodes like hallucination. 34 
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